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Congress’s Competing Motivations: What Chevron Can Tell 
Us About Constitutional Acquiescence 
GEORGE KRUG* 
This Note asks under what conditions the Supreme Court would find evidence of post-
Founding historical practice persuasive in separation of powers debates. This Note 
focuses on two theories of how evidence of a long-standing historical practice might 
be relevant in separation of powers disputes: constitutional liquidation and 
historical gloss. According to both theories, the authority of a long-standing 
historical practice depends in part on the motivations driving the relevant branch of 
government to engage in that practice. Current scholarship on constitutional 
liquidation and historical gloss, however, has not yet explored fully these motivations 
in a way that recognizes the actual dynamics of interbranch relations.  
 This Note explores those motivations in detail by examining the motivations 
driving Congress to grant its interpretive authority to an administrative agency 
under Chevron. Ultimately, I conclude that Congress faces the same competing 
motivations when granting its interpretive authority to an administrative agency as 
when deciding to engage in a long-standing historical practice. As a result, 
understanding how the Court interprets congressional motivations in the Chevron 
context should inform how the Court views congressional motivations in the context 
of constitutional liquidation and historical gloss. Moreover, because Chevron is 
likely to be reformed in the near future, future changes to Chevron should indicate 
when and to what extent the Court will find constitutional liquidation or historical 
gloss persuasive in separation of powers debates. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Constitutional law is . . . rife with claims of authority by historical practice.”1 
This is because the Constitution’s meaning is not always clear.2 Historical practice 
is one type of evidence of the Constitution’s meaning.3 Specifically, it encompasses 
a wide range of sources interpreting the meaning of the Constitution after the 
Founding, such as judicial opinions, congressional determinations, and presidential 
actions.4  Scholars have relied on the authority of historical practice in recent debates 
about court-packing schemes,5 the President’s power to declare war,6 and the 
President’s power to confer recess appointments.7 Historical practice has informed 
understandings of the Constitution since the Founding. As James Madison wrote, 
“difficulties and differences of opinion might occasionally arise in expounding terms 
& phrases necessarily used in [the Constitution] . . . and . . . it might require a regular 
course of practice to liquidate & settle the meaning of some of them.”8 In his famous 
opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Frankfurter similarly 
recognized the importance of historical practice in shaping the President’s 
constitutional powers, finding an unbroken practice that is long carried out by the 
President and unquestioned by Congress may be treated as a “gloss” on the executive 
powers of the President.9 
 
 
 1. William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2019); see also 
Ryan D. Doerfler, High-Stakes Interpretation, 116 MICH. L. REV. 523, 537 (2018) (“[A] 
popular claim as of late is that postenactment practice can render constitutional text clearer 
or—more controversially—less clear.”). 
 2. See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of 
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 417–18 (2012); see also infra notes 42–54 and accompanying 
text. 
 3. See Baude, supra note 1, at 3 (referring to historical practice as “a source of 
constitutional meaning”). 
 4. See id. (“Historical practice is not quite the same as precedent, because it expands 
well beyond judicial opinions.”); see also infra notes 64–66 and accompanying text 
(discussing the repeated passage of statutes as well as various presidential actions as examples 
of historical practices). 
 5. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional 
Conventions, and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255, 270 (2017) 
[hereinafter Bradley & Siegel, Historical Gloss and the Judicial Separation of Powers]. 
 6. See, e.g., Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 461–68. 
 7. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, 
Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (2014) 
[hereinafter Bradley & Siegel, After Recess]. 
 8. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525 (2014) (quoting James Madison, Letter to 
Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 447, 450 (Gaillard Hunt 
ed., 1908)). 
 9. 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[A] systematic, unbroken, 
executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before 
questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making 
as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a 
gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”). 
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Nonetheless, the legitimacy of historical practice arguments has remained the 
subject of debate among scholars10 and judges alike.11 To some, historical practice 
arguments remain “a slippery, unhelpfully capacious notion masquerading as a mid-
twentieth-century neutral principle.”12 Part of the reason for this characterization is 
that scholars have paid little academic attention to how historical practice arguments 
can be used to interpret the Constitution’s separation of powers provisions.13 What 
scholarship does exist on this topic suffers from another problem: it does not study 
historical practice in a way that recognizes the actual dynamics of interbranch 
relations.14 This is particularly problematic because the efficacy of historical practice 
arguments in constitutional debates depends on the motivation driving that practice.15  
This Note attempts to remedy this problem by arguing that the current debate 
about the constitutionality of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. can shed light on when courts will find historical practice arguments 
persuasive in debates about the separation of powers.16 This is because the 
 
 
 10. Baude, supra note 1, at 6–8; Michael B. Rappaport, Why Non-Originalism Does Not 
Justify Departing from the Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 38 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 889, 893 n.8 (2015) (finding not only that “[t]he use of practice as a mode 
of interpretation or construction within originalism is sometimes controversial” but also that 
the question of whether practice can liquidate the meaning of ambiguous provisions is a 
“complicated question”). 
 11. See Noel Canning, 573 U.S. at 572–73 (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding that while “a 
governmental practice [that] has been open, widespread, and unchallenged since the early days 
of the Republic . . . should guide our interpretation of an ambiguous constitutional provision,” 
a “self-aggrandizing practice adopted by one branch well after the founding, often challenged, 
and never before blessed by this Court . . . does not relieve us of our duty to interpret the 
Constitution in light of its text, structure, and original understanding”). 
 12. Baude, supra note 1, at 3 (quoting Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Gloss: A Primer, 
126 HARV. L. REV. F. 75, 77–78 (2013)); see also Shalev Roisman, Constitutional 
Acquiescence, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 668, 674–75 (2016). 
 13. See Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 413 (“Surprisingly, however, there has been little 
sustained academic attention to the proper role of historical practice in the context of 
separation of powers.”); Roisman, supra note 12, at 674–75 (calling attention to “a general, 
and surprising, lack of rigor in how historical branch practice is used in separation of powers 
interpretation”); see also Baude, supra note 1, at 8 (quoting Bradley et al., After Recess, supra 
note 7, at 29). 
 14. Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 413–14 (“[T]he existing literature has not assimilated 
insights from political science concerning the actual dynamics of congressional-executive 
relations, even though such work has heavily influenced other recent public law scholarship.”). 
 15. See infra notes 26–30 and accompanying text. 
 16. In fact, in a recent law review article for the Duke Law Journal, Johnathan Hall noted 
the relationship between the scholarship surrounding historical gloss and the nondelegation 
doctrine, a doctrine closely related to Chevron. Specifically, Hall noted “the relationship 
between that recently blossoming area of scholarship and this age-old question deserves more 
attention.” Johnathan Hall, The Gorsuch Test: Gundy v. United States, Limiting the 
Administrative State, and the Future of Nondelegation, 70 DUKE L.J. 175, 180 n.25 (2020). 
And while the focus of this Note is not the nondelegation doctrine, Hall seems to be suggesting 
that historical gloss can be used to analyze various administrative law issues. While not the 
primary focus of this Note, Section II.D can certainly be viewed as a historical gloss analysis 
of Chevron. 
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constitutional legitimacy of both long-standing historical practices and Chevron 
deference depends on Congress’s motivations.17 Moreover, while Chevron’s two-
step framework has its problems,18 Chevron is frequently debated and discussed and 
will likely be changed in ways that are more attuned to Congress’s competing 
motivations in the near future.19 As a result, the current debate surrounding Chevron 
can provide scholars of historical practice with critical insights into how the Court 
views evidence of Congress’s motivations, and thus the persuasive authority of 
historical practice arguments.  
This Note differs from other scholarship focused on the normative justifications 
for using historical practice arguments in separation of powers debates.20 Instead, it 
considers how we will know if the current Court is receptive to such arguments. Part 
I of this Note introduces two theories of historical practice arguments: constitutional 
liquidation and historical gloss. Part I then discusses the difficulty of ascertaining 
Congress’s motivations and explains why the authority of historical practice in 
constitutional interpretation depends on these motivations. Part II introduces 
Chevron’s interpretive framework. Part II then explains that the authority of 
Chevron’s interpretive framework also depends on Congress’s motivations and that 
reforms to Chevron will indicate how the Court views evidence of congressional 
motivations. Part III explains why these reforms will indicate how the Court views 
evidence of historical practice in interpreting the Constitution’s separation of powers 
provisions: Congress faces the same competing motivations in the Chevron context 
as when assessing the constitutionality of a historical practice. 
I. HISTORICAL PRACTICE AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
There are a variety of theories of constitutional interpretation drawing on 
historical practice. The focus of this Note is on theories that look to a repeated course 
of practice as evidence of the Constitution’s meaning. Such theories have more in 
common with the way the Court has applied Chevron than other theories of historical 
practice that do not require a repeated course of practice. Therefore, theories such as 
Bruce Ackerman’s “constitutional moments” or Adrian Vermeule’s “constitutional 
showdowns” will not be discussed.21 Instead, the focus of this Note will be on the 
theories of constitutional liquidation and historical gloss. Section I.A discusses the 
basic principles of these theories. In short, both are theories of interpreting 
ambiguous provisions in the Constitution by looking beyond Founding-era evidence 
 
 
 17. See infra notes 25–30, 124–26 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 112–15 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 102–07, 133–40 and accompanying text. 
 20. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Madisonian 
Liquidation, and the Originalism Debate, 106 VA. L. REV. 1, 40 (2020) [hereinafter Bradley 
& Siegel, Historical Gloss and the Originalism Debate]; Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 461–
68. 
 21. Though invoking evidence of historical practice, these theories focus on “particularly 
decisive moments in history” and “critical turning points” when the Constitution’s meaning 
was decided. Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 427. For reasons that will become clear, these 
theories are less comparable to the well-established practice of deference to administrative 
agencies embodied by Chevron. 
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and judicial precedent and identifying agreements reached between the political 
branches on a practice’s constitutionality. 
A. Constitutional Liquidation and Historical Gloss 
Both constitutional liquidation and historical gloss look beyond the limited scope 
of Founding-era evidence and modern notions of stare decisis and look to post-
Founding historical practice by each of the branches of government to interpret the 
Constitution’s meaning.22 Specifically, arguments based on historical practice 
attempt to resolve uncertainty in constitutional provisions in a way that does not 
disturb long-standing practices of the political branches.23 Arguments based in 
historical practice are often invoked in the separation of powers context because 
separation of powers disputes often “involve[] the ‘acquiescence’ of one branch in 
the actions of another.”24 But, like other theories of constitutional interpretation, 
historical practice theories do not attempt to explain the Constitution’s meaning in 
all circumstances, and each theory differs in the way historical practice informs the 
Constitution’s meaning.  
Both constitutional liquidation and historical gloss use the acquiescence approach 
to determine whether a given historical practice serves as evidence of that practice’s 
constitutionality.25 Under the acquiescence approach, one branch’s long-standing 
historical practice is indicative of the practice’s constitutionality only if the other 
branch has “acquiesced” in that practice on the basis of constitutional analysis.26 The 
primary justification for this approach is that acquiescence represents a legal or 
functional agreement about the constitutionality of the practice.27 These justifications 
are most persuasive if, in the separation of powers context, the actions of the political 
branches are primarily motivated by constitutional analysis.28 However, a branch 
 
 
 22. See generally Baude, supra note 1, at 63 (discussing the similarities and differences 
liquidation has with “other methods of giving weight to historical practice” such as historical 
gloss). 
 23. See Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Constitutional Structure, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 789, 
814–15 (2018). 
 24. Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 414. 
 25. See Roisman, supra note 12, at 676 (“The primary way that historical practice is used 
in constitutional interpretation of separation of powers issues is through the acquiescence 
approach.”); see also Curtis A. Bradley, Doing Gloss, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 59, 75 (2017) (“If the 
claim is that the two political branches have long had a shared understanding of the separation 
of powers, the claim will require an especially strong form of acquiescence: actual interbranch 
agreement about the law.”). 
 26. Roisman, supra note 12, at 676, 679. It is important to note, however, that 
“acquiescence” has been given a range of meanings. Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 433. The 
focus of this Note, however, is on instances where acquiescence reflects an agreement that the 
actions taken by the branches are lawful. In this context, the key question is whether the 
branches share an understanding of the constitutional question at issue. Id. 
 27. Roisman, supra note 12, at 677. Scholars have posited other justifications for the 
acquiescence approach as well. First, acquiescence should be privileged because it represents 
an “interbranch bargain.” Id. at 678. Second, acquiescence may result in justifiable reliance 
by the branches or other third parties on past practice. Id. at 678–79. 
 28. See id. at 684. If this is the case, the acquiescence model makes sense: it would suggest 
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might act for any number of reasons without regard to the constitutional issue at 
hand.29 For example, a political branch might act out of ignorance to the 
constitutional issue, it might act based on preference for a certain policy outcome, or 
it might act because it lacks the power to oppose another branch’s actions.30 Given 
the competing motivations of the political branches, scholars recognize that when 
past practice is used as evidence of the Constitution’s meaning, especially strong 
evidence is required to show the political branches have reached an agreement on the 
basis of constitutional analysis.31 
Both constitutional liquidation and historical gloss recognize political branches 
have motives beyond constitutional analysis and both consider how acquiescence 
based on constitutional analysis might be determined. To Madison, “[a]ll new laws . 
. . [were] considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be 
liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.”32 
Madison’s theory of constitutional liquidation rested on two central principles: (1) 
the Constitution does not have a fully determined meaning, and (2) indeterminacies 
could be settled through subsequent practice.33 But not all long-standing practices 
could liquidate the Constitution’s meaning. Rather, Madison’s theory of liquidation 
had three requirements: (1) indeterminacy in the Constitution’s text, (2) a regular 
course of deliberate practice, and (3) settlement.34 
The theory of historical gloss, deriving from Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in 
Youngstown,35 takes a similar approach.36 The basic idea of historical gloss “is that 
long-standing practices by one political branch that are acquiesced in by the other 
political branch should be given weight in discerning whether governmental conduct 
is consistent with the separation of powers.”37 An early example of the Court 
invoking historical gloss was McCulloch v. Maryland, where the Court used 
 
 
that the practice resulted from agreement on the constitutional authority in question. Id. 
 29. Id. at 684–85; see also infra notes 76–86 and accompanying text. 
 30. See Roisman, supra note 12, at 684–85. 
 31. See id. at 710 (proposing a method of looking to past practice that “will attempt to 
privilege only historic branch practice that is likely to be indicative of constitutional agreement 
between the branches—as opposed to practice resulting from branch ignorance, apathy, policy 
agreement, path dependence, or coercion”); see also Bradley, supra note 25, at 75 (“If the 
claim is that the two political branches have long had a shared understanding of the separation 
of powers, the claim will require an especially strong form of acquiescence: actual interbranch 
agreement about the law. Mere long-standing practice and lack of resistance by another branch 
will not be sufficient.”).  
 32. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 287 (James Madison) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1864). 
 33. Baude, supra note 1, at 9. 
 34. Id. at 13. 
 35. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 36. See Bradley et al., Historical Gloss and the Originalism Debate, supra note 20, at 40 
(“[I]t is not entirely clear whether and to what extent the concept of liquidation differs from 
the historical gloss approach. Indeed, as we noted in the Introduction, the majority in Noel 
Canning seemed to treat liquidation and gloss as the same phenomenon.”). 
 37. Bradley et al., After Recess, supra note 7, at 21; see also Bradley et al., Historical 
Gloss and the Judicial Separation of Powers, supra note 5, at 261 (referring again to historical 
gloss as “giv[ing] weight to longstanding practices of the government” when interpreting “the 
distribution of constitutional authority between Congress and the President”). 
351931-ILJ 96-2_Text.indd   294 3/26/21   11:27 AM
2021] CONGRESS’S COMPETING MOTIVATIONS  643 
 
historical gloss to settle Congress’s authority to establish the national bank.38 While 
historical gloss theory does not impose the same requirements that constitutional 
liquidation uses to determine whether a long-standing practice can serve as evidence 
of the Constitution’s meaning, historical gloss scholars have nonetheless 
contemplated the significance of acquiescence given the competing motivations 
driving political branch action.39 As the following discussion will make clear, 
however, both constitutional liquidation and historical gloss lack a “consistent and 
rigorous method of determining when past practice should be treated as the result of 
constitutional agreement and when it should be treated as the result of other 
factors.”40 
B. Ascertaining Constitutional Agreement 
The goal of Section I.B is to identify a problem for which current debates about 
Chevron may provide an answer: When should a political branch’s long-standing 
practice serve as evidence of the Constitution’s meaning?41 Section I.B.1 notes that 
a long-standing practice can serve as evidence of the Constitution’s meaning only in 
the presence of an ambiguous constitutional provision. Section I.B.2 notes that even 
when the constitutional text is ambiguous, a practice may not serve as evidence of 
the Constitution’s meaning, because Congress often engages in practices without 
regard to that practice’s constitutionality.  
1. Indeterminacy 
Whether a political branch has adopted a practice on the basis of constitutional 
agreement depends on the clarity of the Constitution’s text.42 In other words, for 
historical practice to be relevant in determining the meaning of the Constitution, the 
provision under consideration must be either ambiguous, meaning the word has more 
than one possible meaning, or vague, meaning the word lacks precision in borderline 
cases.43 Madison specifically imagined historical practice could settle the meaning 
of the Constitution with regard to a specific kind of ambiguity: ambiguity in the 
Constitution’s separation of powers provisions.44  
 
 
 38. 17 U.S. 316, 401 (1819) (giving great weight to “[a]n exposition of the Constitution, 
deliberately established by legislative acts, on the faith of which an immense property has been 
advanced”); Bradley et al., After Recess, supra note 7, at 21–22 (describing McCulloch as an 
early example of the court invoking historical gloss in interpreting the constitutional authority 
of Congress and the President). 
 39. See supra notes 25–28. 
 40. Roisman, supra note 12, at 711 (emphasis in original). 
 41. See id. at 696 (“The problem is that we simply cannot automatically know from the 
fact that a government act was taken that it was taken for constitutional reasons.”). 
 42. Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 430 (“The more an interpreter deems nonpractice 
evidence like the text and original understanding to be clear, the less likely the interpreter is 
to credit historical practice that points in a different direction.”). 
 43. Baude, supra note 1, at 14.  
 44. See id. at 15 (discussing “the possibility of ambiguity in separation of powers disputes, 
an ambiguity that ‘supposes the constitution to have given the power to one department only; 
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When the Constitution’s text is ambiguous, historical practice may indicate an 
agreement on the basis of constitutionality. For example, in “Constitutional 
Liquidation,” William Baude discusses the example of the debate over the 
constitutionality of the national bank. As Baude notes, the debate turned on a proper 
understanding of the Necessary and Proper Clause, specifically in relation to 
Congress’s power to tax and borrow money.45 Madison believed the bank was neither 
necessary nor “incident to the nature” of Congress’s powers.46 Congress, on the other 
hand, thought otherwise, and the bank bill passed.47 Years later, when Chief Justice 
Marshall considered the constitutionality of the bank, he recognized that had the 
unconstitutionality of Congress’s actions been clear, liquidation would be 
irrelevant.48 It was only “a doubtful question, one on which human reason may 
pause” which could be “put at rest by the practice of the government.”49 
Modern debates, such as the debate about the constitutionality of recess 
appointments in NLRB v. Noel Canning, also indicate the importance of textual 
ambiguity to historical practice arguments.50 In Noel Canning, the Court considered 
the scope of the phrase “the Recess of the Senate” in the Recess Appointments 
Clause.51 After considering the possible meanings of “the recess,” with consultation 
to Founding-era evidence, the Court found the text to be ambiguous, and only then 
were historical practice arguments invoked.52 Other debates, such as the debate 
surrounding the constitutionality of court-packing schemes, indicate that some 
arguments based in historical practice may not require a specific ambiguous textual 
hook.53 In fact, unlike constitutional liquidation, historical gloss does not view 
ambiguity as a “hard boundary”—where the text is clear, contrary historical practice 
is possible, it is just much less likely an interpreter will accept that practice as 
constitutional.54 
Generally, however, where the constitutional text is clear, contrary historical 
practice cannot serve as evidence of that practice’s constitutionality. For example, in 
INS v. Chadha, the Court dismissed the long-standing historical practice of Congress 
 
 
and the doubt to be to which it has been given’” (quoting James Madison, Helvidius Number 
II (1793), reprinted in THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES OF 1793–1794: TOWARD THE 
COMPLETION OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 65, 68–69 (Morton J. Frisch ed., 2007))). 
 45. Id. at 21. 
 46. Id. at 21–22. 
 47. See id. at 22. 
 48. See id. at 24. 
 49. Id. at 24 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 401 (1819)). 
 50. 573 U.S. 513 (2014).  
 51. Id. at 518–19 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2). 
 52. Id. at 526–28.  
 53. As Curtis Bradley and Neil Siegel note, there is little in the text directly addressing 
the constitutionality of court-packing. Bradley et al., Historical Gloss and the Judicial 
Separation of Powers, supra note 5, at 270. The authors discuss Article III and Article I as 
possible sources of authority, id. at 270, but note that debates about court-packing “lack . . . a 
textual hook in the Constitution,” id. at 276. 
 54. See Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 431 (“The very fact that an interpreter deems that 
materials like the constitutional text and original understanding point clearly in a particular 
direction makes it less likely that the interpreter will accept an outcome pointing in another 
direction.”). 
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enacting “legislative veto” provisions as unconstitutional.55 Specifically, the Court 
noted that “the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful 
in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary 
to the Constitution.”56 In finding the practice unconstitutional, the Court referred to 
the “[e]xplicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution” that “prescribe and 
define the respective functions of the Congress and of the Executive in the legislative 
process.”57  
It should come as no surprise, then, that criticisms of historical practice arguments 
tend to be originalist and formalist in nature. Formalists are those who believe the 
Constitution establishes clear, understandable, and enforceable rules for the proper 
separation of powers and are often associated with textualist approaches to 
interpretation.58 Chadha is itself a textualist and formalist opinion.59 Justice Scalia’s 
concurring opinion in Noel Canning provides another example of originalist, and 
formalist, reasoning incompatible with historical practice arguments. In finding the 
long-standing practice of intra-session recess appointments to be unconstitutional,60 
Scalia determined, after consulting Founding-era evidence, the plain meaning of the 
text at issue, “the Recess,” referred unambiguously to the gap between sessions, not 
“breaks in the midst of a session”.61 Justice Scalia, however, did not reject the use of 
historical practice arguments in all contexts and specifically recognized that “where 
a governmental practice has been open, widespread, and unchallenged since the early 
days of the Republic, the practice should guide our interpretation of an ambiguous 
constitutional provision.”62 
Both constitutional liquidation and historical gloss recognize, however, that more 
than ambiguity is required for historical practice to serve as evidence of the 
Constitution’s meaning. Otherwise a “single act in the face of indeterminacy” would 
be sufficient evidence of constitutionality, and the Constitution’s meaning would not 
limit government’s actions as long as the relevant provision was indeterminate.63 
 
 
 55. See 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983); see also Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 423 (concluding 
that the Court in INS v. Chadha “held that a ‘legislative veto’ provision enacted by Congress 
was unconstitutional”). 
 56. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944. 
 57. Id. at 945. 
 58. John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 1939, 1958 (2011) (“[W]ithin the tradition of ordinary textual interpretation . . . are 
formalist opinions resisting the perceived reassignment of a power from one branch to another, 
contrary to the allocation originally effected by one of the Vesting Clauses.”). Functionalists, 
by contrast, believe the text of the Constitution provides little guidance. Id. at 1950. Given the 
Constitution’s “silences,” functionalists believe Congress, aided by the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, is responsible for determining how the government’s powers are to be carried out. Id. 
at 1951. 
 59. Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 431. 
 60. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 575 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 61. Id. (“The Court’s contrary conclusion—that ‘the Recess’ includes ‘breaks in the midst 
of a session,’ . . . —is inconsistent with the Constitution’s text and structure, and it requires 
judicial fabrication of vague, unadministrable limits on the recess-appointment power . . . .”). 
 62. Id. at 572. 
 63. Baude, supra note 1, at 16. 
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2. Deliberation and Settlement 
Only a regular course of practice can fill out the meaning of an ambiguous 
constitutional provision.64 Baude’s discussion of the constitutionality of the national 
bank suggests the repeated actions of successive legislatures, specifically Congress’s 
repeated passage of statutes reinforcing the constitutionality of the bank bill, 
constitutes such practice.65 Curtis Bradley and Neil Siegel examined the extent to 
which congressional action supports the constitutionality of court packing, looking 
to repeated instances where Congress had altered the size of the Court after the 
Founding.66 The Supreme Court in Noel Canning looked to presidential actions 
interpreting the recess appointment power and instances where a federal court 
affirmed that power.67 The purpose of this requirement is to prevent practices that are 
engaged in for nonconstitutional reasons, such as political will, from being credited 
as interpreting the meaning of the Constitution.68 
But Madison knew that even a regular course of practice may result from political 
will and not genuine constitutional agreement between the branches. This is because, 
as historical gloss theorists have studied more closely, political branches often act 
for a number of reasons beyond constitutional analysis.69 To combat the possibility 
 
 
 64. Madison had a variety of names for such a course of repeated practice: “[A] ‘regular 
course of practice’; a ‘course of practice of sufficient uniformity and duration’; a ‘continued 
course of practical sanctions’; ‘reiterated sanctions ... thro’ a long period of time’; a ‘settled 
practice, enlightened by occurring cases’; a ‘course of authoritative, deliberate and continued 
decisions’; or a ‘course of authoritative expositions sufficiently deliberate, uniform, and 
settled.’” Id. at 16 (footnotes omitted). 
 65. See id. at 23–24. Baude specifically discusses McCulloch v. Maryland, where Chief 
Justice Marshall stated the constitutionality of the bank had “been recognised by many 
successive legislatures” and that “[a]n exposition of the constitution, deliberately established 
by legislative acts, on the faith of which an immense property has been advanced, ought not 
to be lightly disregarded.” Id. at 24 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 401 
(1819)). 
 66. See Bradley et al., Historical Gloss and the Judicial Separation of Powers, supra note 
5, at 270–72. Bradley and Siegel specifically examined congressional statutes passed 
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the passing of which are discussed later in 
this section. See infra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 67. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 528 (2014) (“In 1867 and 1868, Congress 
for the first time took substantial, nonholiday intra-session breaks, and President Andrew 
Johnson made dozens of recess appointments. The Federal Court of Claims upheld one of 
those specific appointments, writing ‘[w]e have no doubt that a vacancy occurring while the 
Senate was thus temporarily adjourned’ during the ‘first session of the Fortieth Congress’ was 
‘legally filled by appointment of the President alone.’” (quoting Gould v. United States, 19 Ct. 
Cl. 593, 595–96 (1884))). 
 68. See Baude, supra note 1, at 16. To Madison, a practice could liquidate the meaning 
of the Constitution if it “ha[d] the uniform sanction of successive Legislative bodies, through 
a period of years and under the varied ascendancy of parties.” Id. (quoting Letter from James 
Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), reprinted in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS 
OF JAMES MADISON, FOURTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 186 (Philadelphia, J.B. 
Lippincott & Co. 1865)). 
 69. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. Each of these possible motivations 
will be discussed more fully below. 
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that a branch has engaged in a practice on grounds other than constitutional 
agreement, constitutional liquidation and historical gloss employ a method for 
determining when a practice should be treated as resulting from constitutional 
analysis and when it should be treated as resulting from other factors.70 Madison’s 
theory of liquidation requires constitutional “deliberation” and “settlement.”71 While 
not articulating any specific requirement, Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison’s 
study of historical gloss suggests constitutional interpreters should look for 
affirmative evidence that the branches acted on the basis of constitutional 
understanding.72 Both approaches can be viewed as variations of the constitutional 
acquiescence model, which states that past practice can inform constitutional 
meaning if one branch has engaged in conduct consistently and the other branch has 
“acquiesced” in that conduct.73 
One possible source of evidence is the creation of reliance interests. As Bradley 
and Morrison note, when one branch of government has been engaging in a practice 
for a long time, that branch of government and affected third parties may begin to 
generate reliance interests if that practice is not resisted.74 Bradley and Morrison use 
the example of the treaty process to illustrate the formation of such an “implicit 
bargain.” While the Constitution states that the Senate should provide “Advice and 
Consent” to the conclusion of treaties, Presidents have not granted the Senate such a 
role since the early days of the Constitution.75 Instead, the Senate has long exercised 
the power to consent to treaties with “reservations” on particular terms.76 Similarly, 
in Noel Canning, the recess appointments case, the Court expressed concern for 
upsetting the compromises and working arrangements reached between the 
branches.77 Such agreements may represent express agreement on the basis of 
constitutional law but might merely reflect the practice’s utility, or an agreement over 
the practice’s feasibility and desirability, rather than a formal notion of legality.78  
This is because, even where branches have relied on the practices initiated by 
another branch, an agreement is not certain to have resulted from constitutional 
 
 
 70. This method amounts to raising the standard of proof, requiring a branch make an 
affirmative showing that an agreement was reached based on constitutional factors, not other 
factors. See Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 448 (“[W]here acquiescence is the touchstone of 
the analysis, the standard for legislative acquiescence should be high.”). 
 71. See Baude, supra note 1, at 18–19. 
 72. Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 451. 
 73. Roisman, supra note 12, at 672 (citing Ryan M. Scoville, Legislative Diplomacy, 112 
MICH. L. REV. 331, 391 (2013)). 
 74. Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 435. 
 75. Id. at 436. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Bradley, supra note 25, at 74. The Court in Noel Canning expressed concern for 
“upset[ting] the compromises and working arrangements that the elected branches of 
Government themselves have reached” and about “seriously shrink[ing] the authority that 
Presidents have believed existed and have exercised for so long.” NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 
U.S. 513, 526, 549 (2014).  Moreover, the Court observed that “three-quarters of a century of 
settled practice is long enough to entitle a practice to ‘great weight in a proper interpretation’ 
of the constitutional provision.” Id. at 533 (quoting Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 
(1929)). 
 78. See Bradley, supra note 25, at 66. 
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analysis. For example, a historical practice may reflect a strategic decision to push 
through policy in a way that generates the least political resistance. As previously 
discussed, Article II of the Constitution allows the President to make treaties “by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate . . . provided two thirds of the Senators 
present concur.”79 However, Presidents have long concluded treaties by receiving the 
approval of Congress instead.80 Part of the reason for this alternative arrangement is 
not because of any express or indirect agreement on the constitutionality of such 
“congressional-executive” agreements but instead because “[t]he executive branch 
found it much easier to conclude international agreements by seeking the approval 
of a majority of Congress rather than that of two-thirds of the Senate.”81 
Moreover, Congress may agree, or fail to object, because it has difficulty resisting 
encroachments on its authority. First, Congress faces structural impediments—
legislation is passed only where it has been approved by both houses of Congress, 
the President has declined to exercise his veto power, and, if the President does veto, 
a supermajority has been reached in both houses.82 Beyond these procedural 
limitations, Congress also faces collective action problems—because all members of 
Congress benefit when legislative authority is enhanced, each individual member has 
little incentive to expend their own resources defending this power, especially 
because the gains are so dissipated.83 As a result, even when the executive is 
expanding its power, Congress will have difficulty in defending its power from 
usurpation.84  
The most direct evidence of constitutional acquiescence on the basis of 
constitutionality is express agreement by Congress that a practice is constitutional. 
As Bradley and Morrison note, however, such direct evidence is rare.85 One example 
was when Congress, in the 1973 War Powers Resolution, expressly agreed with the 
executive branch that the President had constitutional authority to use military force 
when responding to “a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, 
its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.”86 Elsewhere in United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the Court noted Congress had long enacted statutes 
granting the President broad foreign affairs authority, which allowed the Court to 
 
 
 79. Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 468 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2). 
 80. Id. at 468–69. 
 81. Id. at 469. 
 82. Id. at 440. 
 83. Id. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule expound on this idea in The Executive Unbound, 
noting that because Congress is a “they,” not an “it,” legislators have a hard time organizing 
to oppose actions taken by the executive. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE 
EXECUTIVE UNBOUND 24 (2010). 
 84. See Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 441. Moreover, members of Congress have less 
incentive than the President to protect the interests of the branch as a whole because their 
primary focus is largely on reelection. See id. at 441–42. Presidents, on the other hand, “have 
both the will and the capacity to promote the power of their own institution, but individual 
legislators have neither and cannot be expected to promote the power of Congress as a whole 
in any coherent, forceful way.” Id. at 443 (quoting Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The 
Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 145 (1999)). 
 85. See id. at 433. 
 86. Id. at 433–34 (quoting H.R.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong. (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 
1541(c) (2006))). 
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conclude the delegation of criminalization authority did not violate the separation of 
powers.87 
But even direct evidence may result from nonconstitutional motivations. This may 
be the case where the relevant actors prefer an outcome as a matter of policy.88 For 
example, though Congress had repeatedly passed statutes changing the size of the 
Court throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it had often done so in 
politicized circumstances: among other examples, in 1801, the size of the Court was 
reduced from six to five by the lame-duck Federalist Congress in order to deny 
incoming President Thomas Jefferson an appointment; in 1837, with Democrats in 
control of the political branches, Congress increased the size of the Court to nine in 
order to place one justice in each of the nine circuits, which meant, because the 
majority of circuits were composed entirely of slave states, a majority of judges 
resided in slave states; and during the Civil War, the Court was expanded to ten to 
accommodate the addition of another circuit when California was added to the 
Union.89 Bradley and Siegel suggest that the circumstances in which these actions 
were taken likely have some effect on how broadly these examples can be read as 
acquiescence on the basis of constitutionality.90 Bradley and Morrison expressed 
similar concerns about the ability of past uses of force to act as precedent in the 
debate over the President’s authority to initiate military conflicts without 
congressional authorization.91 
In summary, the problem with using branch acquiescence as evidence of a 
practice’s constitutionality is that we simply cannot know automatically from the fact 
of a government act whether that act was taken for constitutional reasons.92 Baude 
claims constitutional liquidation is insulated from this criticism because liquidation 
 
 
 87. Bradley, supra note 25, at 69 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 
U.S. 304, 329 (1936)). In Curtiss-Wright, the Court found that “[t]he uniform, long-continued 
and undisputed legislative practice just disclosed rests upon an admissible view of the 
Constitution which, even if the practice found far less support in principle than we think it 
does, we should not feel at liberty at this late day to disturb.” Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 329. 
 88. See Roisman, supra note 12, at 688–89 (“Several scholars have noted that past 
practice might be motivated by nonconstitutional reasons, such as policy agreement or 
politics.”). 
 89. Bradley et al., supra note 5, at 271–72. 
 90. See id. at 272–73. That Congress has changed the size of the Court in a variety of 
circumstances, sometimes when politically motivated, may suggest Congress has broad 
authority to alter the Court, both for concerns over workload and efficiency and for ideological 
concerns. Id. Such practice may also indicate, however, that the power to change the size of 
the Court is limited to specific circumstances and may not support Congress changing the size 
of the Court in other contexts, as a reaction to disagreeing with specific decisions of the Court, 
for example. See id. at 273. 
 91. See Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 465 (“Prior uses of force have varied along 
numerous dimensions—such as duration, risk to U.S. forces, connection to U.S. national 
security interests, and level of international support—often making it debatable whether a 
given action in the present falls within past precedents.”); see also Baude, supra note 1, at 47–
48 (noting the usage of past practice can be problematic “because past practice often reflects 
nonconstitutional concerns, and, moreover, ‘will systematically serve to validate the power of 
the more active and powerful branch.’” (quoting Roisman, supra note 12, at 673)). 
 92. Roisman, supra note 12, at 696. 
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requires “attention to the constitutional issue.”93 Certainly liquidation’s 
“deliberation” requirement increases the likelihood that historical practice will be 
credited only when branches are acting on the basis of constitutional analysis. But 
Baude provides little direction on how “deliberation” may be shown.          
Baude and Shalev Roisman offer two further methods of how acquiescence on the 
basis of constitutional analysis can be distinguished from acquiescence motivated by 
other factors. In addition to indeterminacy and deliberation, Baude discusses 
Madison’s third requirement for liquidation: settlement. Settlement requires that (1) 
those that opposed the practice have stopped doing so, and (2) the practice received 
“public sanction.”94 In other words, the liquidated practice had been sufficiently 
repeated without controversy.95 Roisman has articulated a similar but stronger 
requirement: not only must the constitutional authority be considered by the branches 
involved, but acquiescence would be most persuasive when acquiescence on 
nonconstitutional grounds is unlikely.96 This would be the case where, for example, 
the branch disagrees with the resulting policy outcome or is controlled by the 
opposing party but nonetheless acquiesces in the practice.97 
 But whether the Court adopts Baude’s or Roisman’s approach or any other 
approach to constitutional acquiescence remains to be seen.98 In the sections that 
follow, this Note argues that current debates about Chevron can indicate when the 
Court will find historical practice persuasive in interpreting the Constitution. This is 
because Chevron’s two-step framework, as well as current and future reforms, will 
demonstrate how the Court examines congressional intent. 
II. CHEVRON AND ITS APPLICABILITY TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL ACQUIESCENCE 
MODEL 
The goal of this Note is not to argue whether specific changes to Chevron should 
be imported into the constitutional acquiescence model. Chevron, as it now stands, 
is a mess99 and is likely to be cabined and reformed in the future.100 Nonetheless, this 
 
 
 93. See Baude, supra note 1, at 48. 
 94. See id. at 18–19. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See Roisman, supra note 12, at 712–16. 
 97. Id. at 715–16. 
 98. See Baude, supra note 1, at 69 (stating that “[W]hether we adopt [liquidation] or reject 
it, we will learn much from it.”). 
 99. Kurt Eggert, Deference and Fiction: Reforming Chevron’s Legal Fictions after King 
v. Burwell, 95 NEB. L. REV. 702, 780 (2017); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, 107 
GEO. L.J. 1613, 1615 (2019) (“Chevron’s foundations are cracking.”). Chevron originally 
stood for the notion that when considering the agency’s construction of a statute, a court faces 
two questions. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
The first question is “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” 
Id. If Congress’s intent is clear, the court must give effect to Congress’s intent. Id. at 842–43. 
If Congress is “silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” however, the court 
considers whether the agency’s interpretation is “based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.” Id. at 843. 
 100. As Sunstein states, “the Court has been taking significant steps toward domesticating 
it; the process is well underway.” Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1672. 
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Part argues that the way the Court cabins Chevron in response to this mess can inform 
models of constitutional acquiescence because both Chevron and the constitutional 
acquiescence model face the same challenges: specifically, that Congress often takes 
action for a host of reasons and it is often hard to determine whether Congress has 
acted on the basis of constitutional motivations. Section II.A proceeds with a brief 
explanation of Chevron step one. Section II.B discusses why constitutional 
arguments for overruling Chevron are not particularly persuasive and that the 
constitutional authority of Chevron rests on congressional instructions. Section II.C 
discusses recent reforms to Chevron as well as possible future reforms to Chevron 
and how they indicate the way the Court examines evidence of congressional 
motivations. Finally, Section II.D concludes with a discussion of the competing 
motivations Congress faces in passing a statute to which Chevron is applied. Because 
Congress faces the same competing motivations in the context of Chevron as when 
choosing to engage in a historical practice, the way the Court reforms Chevron will 
also indicate when it finds historical practice persuasive in interpreting the 
Constitution’s separation of powers provisions.   
A. Brief Overview of Chevron Step One 
As the constitutional acquiescence model recognizes, it is difficult to know 
whether Congress has acted on the basis of constitutional motivations or other 
competing motivations.101 Nonetheless, Chevron rests on the assumption that when 
Congress has not clearly resolved an issue, Congress has intended for an 
administrative agency, rather than a court, to fill the gap.102 But this assumption is 
nothing more than a legal fiction.103 As Eben Moglen and Richard Pierce note, 
 
 
 101. See Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1623. Here, Sunstein points out a fundamental issue 
with the Supreme Court’s current approach to deference: “Why is it right to assume that when 
agencies have exercised rulemaking or adjudicatory authority, Congress has instructed courts 
to defer to agency interpretations of law? There is no clear or direct evidence that Congress 
wanted that.” Id. at 1663. 
 102. Randy J. Kozel, Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Deference, and the Law of 
Stare Decisis, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1125, 1154 (2019) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44 (“If 
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of 
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such 
legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a 
particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its 
own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the 
administrator of an agency.”)); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) 
(“Yet it can still be apparent from the agency’s generally conferred authority and other 
statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the 
force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute . . . .”). 
 103. Kurt Eggert, Deference and Fiction: Reforming Chevron’s Legal Fictions after King 
v. Burwell, 95 NEB. L. REV. 702, 739–40 (2017) (“Chevron employs the fiction that any gap 
in a statute administered by an agency constitutes an implicit delegation of interpretive power 
to federal agencies.”); David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 
2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 224 n.85 (2001) (noting Justice Breyer’s observation that “[f]or the 
most part courts have used ‘legislative intent to delegate the law-interpreting function’ as a 
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“Congress rarely ‘intends’ to give the President greater policymaking power.”104 In 
fact, though Congress could clearly make its intent known on the deference question, 
it rarely chooses to do so.105 As the Court notes in Chevron, Congress may leave gaps 
in statutes for a number of reasons: Congress, for example, may simply desire the 
agency’s expertise, it may simply not have addressed the question, or it may be 
unable to form a coalition around the issue.106 Nonetheless, courts treat the presence 
of such gaps as a delegation of interpretive power to agencies because “[f]or judicial 
purposes, it matters not which of these things occurred.”107  
Of course, Chevron imposes some limits on when agency deference can be 
implied from Congress’s actions. This approach is Chevron’s two-step standard of 
review,108 which “instructs courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute 
the agency administers if, at step one, the statutory provision at issue is ambiguous 
and then, at step two, the agency’s interpretation of the statutory ambiguity is 
reasonable.”109 Focusing specifically on step one, in which the question of whether 
Congress intended to defer to an agency is considered, the Court in Chevron stated, 
“First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for 
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress.”110 
Step one, in other words, requires an inquiry into whether Congress’s instructions 
are ambiguous.111 The focus of this Note is on step one because step one will be most 
informative to the problem facing the constitutional acquiescence model: whether 
Congress acted on the basis of constitutional reasons or on the basis of other 
competing motivations.  
 
 
kind of legal fiction” (quoting Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and 
Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986))). In determining whether Congress intended for 
delegation, however, the Court in Mead found authorizations to engage in rulemaking or 
adjudication that produces regulations entitled to deference were a good indicator. Mead, 533 
U.S. at 229–30. 
 104. Eben Moglen & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sunstein’s New Canons: Choosing the Fictions 
of Statutory Interpretation, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1213 (1990). 
 105. See Barron et al., supra note 103, at 212; John F. Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, 
115 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1932 (2015) (“In no opinion has the Court premised its application 
of Chevron on the existence of legislative history suggesting that Congress preferred or 
disfavored a deferential approach under a given organic act.”). 
 106. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
 107. Id.; Eggert, supra note 103, at 741. 
 108. Scholars have frequently referred to Chevron’s two-step interpretive framework as a 
standard of review. See, e.g., Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s 
Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1444 (2017) (“Chevron is, primarily, just a standard 
of review rather than a rule of decision.”); Kevin M. Stack, The Interpretive Dimension of 
Seminole Rock, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669, 680 (2015) (referring to Chevron as a standard 
of review); E. Garrett West, A Youngstown for the Administrative State, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 
629, 661 (2018) (stating Chevron is not a canon but is much like a standard of review). 
 109. Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature Review, 
16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 110 (2018) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (1984)). 
 110. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
 111. See supra text accompanying note 109. 
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B. Constitutional Concerns 
Chevron can inform our understanding of acquiescence because it is not likely to 
be found unconstitutional, despite arguments to the contrary. That is not to say judges 
are not concerned about Chevron’s constitutionality, however. For example, in his 
concurring opinion in Michigan v. EPA, Justice Thomas found that Chevron prevents 
judges from exercising their independent judgment to “say what the law is,” thereby 
conflicting with Article III’s vesting clause, which vests the judicial power 
exclusively with Article III courts, rather than administrative agencies.112 Recent 
criticisms by Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh have echoed these concerns.113 
In particular, Justice Kavanaugh has criticized Chevron on the grounds that it allows 
the executive branch to choose an interpretation of an ambiguous statute, and so long 
as that interpretation is reasonable, that interpretation carries the force of law even if 
everyone else tasked with interpreting the statute believes there is a better 
interpretation.114 Chevron has also given rise to Article I concerns. As Justice Jordan 
of the Tenth Circuit pointed out in Egan v. Delaware River Port Authority, Chevron 
erodes Congress’s legislative powers by encouraging Congress to abdicate its 
lawmaking authority by passing vague laws to be filled in and interpreted by 
agencies, rather than taking on the greater burden of reaching a consensus on difficult 
issues.115  
These arguments are unconvincing for a number of reasons, however.116 First, as 
a practical matter, the costs of overturning Chevron would be significant and would 
likely result in confusion, conflicts in the courts of appeals, and increased 
politicization of administrative law.117 Moreover, not only has Chevron reduced the 
effects of judicial policy preferences—one of its intended goals—but it has also 
generated a significant amount of reliance interest among agencies and Congress.118 
Finally, as Nicholas R. Bednar and Kristin E. Hickman note, “[a]rguments abound 
 
 
 112. Walker, supra note 109, at 111–12 (quoting Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 
(2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Chevron deference precludes judges from exercising that 
judgment, forcing them to abandon what they believe is ‘the best reading of an ambiguous 
statute’ in favor of an agency’s construction.”)). 
 113. Jonathan R. Siegel, The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference, 71 VAND. L. 
REV. 937, 950 (2018) (“Reaching back to the foundational case of Marbury v. Madison, Justice 
Gorsuch pointed out that under that case, resolution of questions of private legal rights is a 
judicial function. Chevron, he said, ‘seems no less than a judge-made doctrine for the 
abdication of the judicial duty.’” (quoting Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 
(2016))); see generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
 114. Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1616–17. This is a result Justice Kavanaugh finds to be 
“[a]mazing.” Id. at 1617 (quoting Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 
HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2150 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 
(2014))). 
 115. Egan v. Del. River Port Auth., 851 F.3d 263, 279 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J., 
concurring).  
 116. See Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1670 (“[E]ven for those who think that Chevron was 
not close to right, the argument for overruling it is not terribly strong.”). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 1671–72. 
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justifying congressional delegations of discretionary power to agencies.”119 Among 
these reasons are a congressional desire to utilize agency policy and scientific 
expertise, which increase statutory quality and reduce enforcement headaches after 
passage.120 
Nor is Chevron likely to be completely overturned as a matter of constitutional 
law. As an Article III issue, Professor Henry Monaghan has noted that the Court is 
not neglecting its duty to “say what the law is” by deferring to an agency’s 
interpretation of a law; rather, the Court is simply applying a law made by a 
congressionally authorized agency.121  As for Article I concerns, Congress can make 
a constitutionally permissible delegation by providing the authorized agency with an 
“intelligible principle” to guide its interpretation.122 It is not difficult for Congress to 
satisfy the “intelligible principle” standard and avoid constitutional concerns.123 In 
fact, the Court has stated that Chevron rests on the presumption that when Congress 
passes an ambiguous statute intended for an agency to interpret, Congress has 




 119. Bednar et al., supra note 108, at 1454. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 27–
28 (1983) (“In this context, the court is not abdicating its constitutional duty to ‘say what the 
law is’ by deferring to agency interpretations of law: it is simply applying the law as ‘made’ 
by the authorized law-making entity.”); Siegel, supra note 113, at 960 (“That is, an ambiguous 
agency statute is simply another way of doing something that Congress does all the time—
namely, authorize an agency to make a policy choice. Innumerable statutes expressly authorize 
agencies to make decisions and prescribe rules that have the force and effect of law, and such 
authorization is routinely approved as constitutional.”); Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1639. 
Sunstein understands Monaghan to mean “it is (emphatically) the province of the judiciary to 
say what the law is. But sometimes the law is what the Executive Branch says that it is. When 
is that? When Congress says so.” Id. 
 122. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (quoting J.W. 
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)); see also Sunstein, supra note 
99, at 1637. 
 123. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474 (“In the history of the Court we have found the requisite 
‘intelligible principle’ lacking in only two statutes, one of which provided literally no guidance 
for the exercise of discretion, and the other of which conferred authority to regulate the entire 
economy on the basis of no more precise a standard than stimulating the economy by assuring 
‘fair competition.’”); see also Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1637 (“If Congress uses a word like 
‘take,’ ‘source,’ or ‘diagnosis,’ and stipulates that the agency may sort out ambiguities in such 
terms, then it has provided an intelligible principle; it has not given any kind of blank check.”). 
 124. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996) (noting Chevron rests 
on the “presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for 
implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and 
foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever 
degree of discretion the ambiguity allows”); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 
218, 229 (2001) (noting while Congress may not have expressly delegated interpretive 
authority to an agency, “[w]hen circumstances implying such an expectation exist, a reviewing 
court has no business rejecting an agency’s exercise of its generally conferred authority to 
resolve a particular statutory ambiguity simply because the agency’s chosen resolution seems 
unwise”). 
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As a result, Chevron seems to depend on congressional instructions.125 That is, if 
Congress has instructed an agency to interpret an ambiguous statute, then Chevron 
deference is insulated from constitutional concerns.126 Congress may instruct agency 
deference for a number of reasons. For example, part of the Court’s reasoning in 
Chevron was a respect for the Executive Branch’s democratic accountability.127 The 
Chevron Court also recognized “agency expertise” as a possible rationale for 
deference, stating Congress may have “desired the [agency] to strike the balance at 
this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for 
administering the provision would be in a better position to do so.”128 Congress may 
also defer to agencies on the basis of a desire for national uniformity.129  
C. Current and Future Chevron Reforms 
But just as the constitutional acquiescence model has recognized, congressional 
instructions are not always clear, and Congress often acts on the basis of political or 
other motivations.130 To ensure agency interpretations are entitled to deference only 
when Congress has delegated interpretive authority to an agency, the Supreme Court 
has introduced additional steps into Chevron’s interpretive framework.131 These 
inquiries can be viewed as a way the Court might examine whether Congress has 
“acquiesced” in a given application of Chevron because they consider evidence of 
Congress’s intent. For example in United States v. Mead, the Court held that agency 
interpretations of statutes qualify for Chevron deference when Congress has 
delegated an agency the authority to act with the force of law and the “agency 
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that 
authority.”132 The Court has also begun to develop a “major questions” exception to 
 
 
 125. See Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1679; Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, 
Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001) (“The Supreme Court in recent years has 
endorsed the notion that Chevron rests on implied congressional intent.”). 
 126.  Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1679 (“So long as Chevron is understood as a response to 
congressional instructions, it does not offend anything in the Constitution.”). 
 127. See id. at 1626; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Future of Deference, 84 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1296 (2016) (describing Chevron as creating a “policy space” in which 
agencies are free to exercise discretion). 
 128. Kent Barnett, Christina L. Boyd, & Christopher J. Walker, Administrative Law’s 
Political Dynamics, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1463, 1476–77 (2018) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
865) (“As Justice Scalia noted decades ago, ‘The cases, old and new, that accept administrative 
interpretations, often refer to the “expertise” of the agencies in question, their intense 
familiarity with the history and purposes of the legislation at issue, and their practical 
knowledge of what will best effectuate those purposes.’”). 
 129. See id. at 1481–82. 
 130. These competing motivations will be discussed in greater detail in Part III. 
 131. For example, Chevron step zero is an “initial inquiry into whether the Chevron 
framework applies at all.” Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 
(2006). The Step Zero inquiry was introduced in United States v. Mead Corp., discussed infra 
note 132 and accompanying text. The “major questions” exception, also discussed infra note 
133–34 and accompanying text, is another step the Supreme Court has introduced into 
Chevron’s interpretive framework.  
 132. 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (“We hold that administrative implementation of a 
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Chevron deference, which is a “[p]resumption against [a] congressional delegation 
of authority for [an] agency to make fundamental changes to society or the 
market.”133 The major questions doctrine in particular has been deeply criticized by 
scholars who view its “unpredictable application as highly destabilizing.”134 
Nonetheless, the goal of both inquiries is to ascertain whether Congress has acted on 
the basis of constitutional motivations (an intention to delegate to an agency) or on 
the basis of other factors.135 If Congress frequently acts on the basis of other factors 
when passing statutes to which a court applies Chevron, these additional inquiries 
can be viewed as a way to ensure Congress has properly acquiesced in a delegation 
of its interpretive power to an agency.136 
Scholars and judges alike have proposed or hinted at numerous other ways to 
reform Chevron in ways that depend on an examination of congressional intent. 
Chief Justice Roberts himself has advocated for a more context-specific inquiry into 
whether Congress definitively authorized an agency to interpret a specific ambiguous 
provision.137  Other scholars have suggested step one should be taken more seriously 
 
 
particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress 
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that 
the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that 
authority.”); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero after City of Arlington, 83 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 753, 766 (2014). 
 133. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW 418 (2016). In other words, the so-
called “major questions” exception is the idea that Congress could not have intended to 
delegate major legal questions to agencies to decide without sufficient textual support. See 
Nathan Richardson, Keeping Big Cases from Making Bad Law: The Resurgent “Major 
Questions” Doctrine, 49 CONN. L. REV. 355, 391–92 (2016). Under the “major questions” 
exception, the Court has granted agency interpretations of congressional statutes “little or no 
weight” when the stakes of the interpretive question are “sufficiently high.” Id. at 358. While 
the Court has not laid out the specific factors that give rise to a “major question,” id. at 381, 
the Court has cited the following reasons for finding a “major question” exception in recent 
cases: the agency interpretation (1) would result in a significant change in the scope of 
regulatory authority, (2) has great economic significance, (3) relates to an issue of ongoing 
political controversy, (4) is based on a thin statutory basis. Id. at 381–85. 
 134. Joshua S. Sellers, “Major Questions” Moderation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 930, 946 
(2019). More specifically, critics view the major questions doctrine as a way to “selectively 
circumvent the traditional deference regime” and prevent agencies from interpreting the kinds 
of complex statutory ambiguities that they are best situated to resolve. See id. at 946–47. 
 135. See id. at 937–39. 
 136. As the following Section discusses, Congress often passes ambiguous statutes for 
reasons other than a constitutionally permissible intention to delegate. See infra notes 139–46 
and accompanying text. 
 137. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 320 (2013) (Roberts, J., dissenting) 
(emphasizing the Court’s rationale for Chevron “rests on a recognition that Congress has 
delegated to an agency the interpretive authority to implement ‘a particular provision’ or 
answer ‘“a particular question.”’”) (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 
(2001)); see also Eggert, supra note 103, at 784 (“[A]bsent real evidence of congressional 
intent, the courts should ask whether and to what extent a rational Congress would intend 
courts to defer in the circumstance in question.”). In Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference, 
Christopher J. Walker characterizes Chief Justice Robert’s approach as “a context-specific 
inquiry into objective congressional intent.” Walker, supra note 109, at 117. The “major 
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so that Chevron only applies to genuinely ambiguous statutory provisions.138 Still 
others propose that Congress state explicitly what level of deference a court should 
afford agency interpretations.139 Again, each of these reforms, if adopted, will 
illustrate how the Court examines congressional intent because they show how the 
Court determines Chevron is applied on the basis of genuine congressional intent to 
delegate.140 In fact, how the Court changes Chevron in the coming years will be 
particularly informative for the way the Court views evidence of congressional 
intent, and thus the persuasive authority of historical practice, because, as will be 
discussed in the following section, Congress faces the same competing motivations 
in the context of Chevron as when engaging in a long-standing historical practice. 
D. Challenges in Ascertaining Congress’s Motivations 
Just as political branches have relied on long-standing historical practices, 
Congress and agencies have generated significant reliance interests on Chevron. As 
Justin Walker has recently noted, “[a]t the very least, eliminating Chevron deference 
would have ‘major practical implications’ for administrative agencies and the parties 
they regulate.”141 More specifically, Congress has long legislated against the 
background of Chevron, and many statutes reflect an understanding that the Court’s 
deference doctrines will apply.142 Agencies themselves have operated on a similar 
 
 
question” doctrine is an example of this context specific approach. See id. at 115–16; see also 
supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text. 
 138. Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1672; Walker, supra note 109, at 117 (noting Justice Scalia 
and Judge Kethledge among the advocates for this approach). 
 139. See Eggert, supra note 103, at 782. Eggert discusses two ways in which Congress 
could explicitly state the level of deference a court should afford to an agency interpretation. 
First, Eggert notes that Congress could codify Chevron by, for example, amending the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to state exactly the conditions in which a court should 
defer to an agency. Id. Another possibility would be for Congress to specify in a particular 
statute when a court should give weight to an agency interpretation. Id.  
 140. See City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 321–22 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“An agency 
interpretation warrants such deference only if Congress has delegated authority to definitively 
interpret a particular ambiguity in a particular manner.”); Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1678 
(noting the goals of reforms to Chevron are to “to ensure the primacy of congressional 
instructions, to forbid arbitrariness, and to use time-honored principles—along with some new 
ones—to cabin the exercise of agency discretion”); Eggert, supra note 103, at 785 (noting 
reforms would allow courts to answer “pertinent policy questions” such as: “Has Congress 
given the agency the authority to engage in the kind of formalized rulemaking procedures that 
would lead the agency to make a thoughtful, informed determination? Has the agency 
appropriately used those procedures and explained its rationale? Is the agency likely to have 
particular expertise and/or institutional memory such that it is better able than a court to reach 
an appropriate interpretation?”). 
 141. Justin Walker, The Kavanaugh Court and the Schecter-to-Chevron Spectrum: How 
the New Supreme Court Will Make the Administrative State More Democratically 
Accountable, 95 IND. L.J. 924, 960 (2020).  
 142. See Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1672. In fact, a survey of 137 congressional staffers in 
2013 indicated eighty-two percent of respondents knew about Chevron and most of them used 
it when drafting statutes. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation 
from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: 
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assumption.143 Just as in finding a longstanding historical practice unconstitutional, 
overturning Chevron would certainly involve “upset[ting] the compromises and 
working arrangements that the elected branches of Government themselves have 
reached.”144 Beyond mere reliance, there is at least some evidence that this approach 
is in fact desirable. As Kent Barnett, Christina Boyd, and Christopher Walker 
indicate, Chevron effectively and powerfully restrains partisanship as compared to 
other standards of review.145 But just as with the acquiescence model, agreement by 
Congress may result from a number of competing reasons. 
For example, as discussed earlier in the context of “congressional-executive” 
agreements,146 Congress may act on the basis of a strategic political calculation. 
Much like the Executive found it easier to secure the approval of the majority of 
Congress rather than that of two-thirds of the Senate, individual legislators will often 
find it easier to delegate politically contentious questions to the Executive through 
passing ambiguous legislation.147 As a result, the Executive Branch will increase its 
power and Congress will continue to abdicate its power “because jockeying for 
control of the Executive becomes a less transaction-costly way of shaping policy than 
the legislative process itself.”148 This is exactly the concern, highlighted earlier, that 
Congress faces collective action problems in protecting its constitutional authority.149 
Also discussed earlier, and applicable here, is that Congress faces procedural hurdles 
in protecting its constitutional authority.150 As a result, if deference is granted to an 
agency interpretation when Congress did not intend to do so, it will have a difficult 
time passing legislation prohibiting deference, just as Congress has a difficult time 
passing legislation opposing historical practices. 
Finally, there is the risk that both Congress and judges will be incentivized to 
defer to agencies on the basis of policy preferences rather than any determination 
that Congress sought deference on the basis of constitutional motivations. First, 
 
 
Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 993–94 (2013). 
 143. Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1672. 
 144. Bradley, supra note 25, at 74. 
 145. Barnett et al., supra note 128, at 1524; see also Nicholas R. Bednar, What to Do About 
Chevron—Nothing, 72 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 151, 153 (2019) (discussing Barnett, Boyd, 
and Walker’s research). 
 146. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 147. See Justin Hurwitz, Chevron’s Political Domain: W(h)ither Step Three?, 68 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 615, 629 (2019); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 571 
(2009) (“[S]cholars have observed that a divided Congress may choose deliberately 
ambiguous words to obtain consensus, thereby delegating interpretive authority to agencies or 
courts.”). 
 148. Hurwitz, supra note 147, at 628. Hurwitz calls such broadly written laws a political 
“double-whammy” for legislators. Id. at 629. This is because legislators on both sides of the 
aisle can claim a victory in solving a problem, and, regardless of how the agency interprets the 
statute, legislators can either claim a victory and campaign on the policy’s success or blame 
the agency and campaign on the policy’s failure. Id.; see also Bressman, supra note 147, at 
571 (“Congress chooses words that are imprecise enough for legislators with opposing views 
each to claim victory. Meanwhile, the language also allows those legislators to press for their 
favored positions at the later administrative or judicial level.”). 
 149. See discussion supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 150. See discussion supra note 72 and accompanying text.  
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empirical studies have indicated that judges are often more likely to defer to an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute when their policy preferences align with those of 
the agency.151 Justice Kavanaugh has expressed significant concern over this conflict, 
stating that “there can be serious incentives and pressures—often subconscious—for 
judges to find textual ambiguity or clarity in certain cases,” as where a judge’s policy 
preferences conflict with an agency’s interpretation of a statute.152 Congress itself is 
also more likely to defer to an executive branch that shares its policy preferences.153 
In other words, as in the constitutional acquiescence model, the question of whether 
Congress was motivated by constitutional reasons is complicated by the fact that 
Congress is often motivated by nonconstitutional reasons, such as policy preferences. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note discussed two competing theories used to determine when 
constitutional acquiescence applies to a long-standing historical practice: 
constitutional liquidation and historical gloss. Both theories, however, face the same 
problem when determining whether a long-standing practice between political 
branches can serve as evidence of that practice’s constitutionality: Congress often 
acts without consideration of the constitutional issue at hand. Some scholars, such as 
Baude and Roisman, have attempted to remedy this problem. However, such 
scholarship lacks a rigorous method for determining how agreement over the 
practice’s constitutionality can be determined in a way that recognizes the actual 
dynamics of congressional-executive relations. The current debate around Chevron’s 
two-step framework can remedy this problem because Congress faces the same 
challenges in expressing its intention to defer to an agency as in expressing its 
acquiescence in the constitutionality of an interbranch practice. Specifically, 
Congress faces constitutional barriers, collective action problems, and the temptation 
 
 
 151. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to 
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2171 
(1998) (finding panels of D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals judges were thirty-one percent more 
likely to defer when its policy preferences are in line with those of the agency’s); Thomas J. 
Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of 
Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 851 (2006) (finding judges are more likely to defer to the 
agency’s interpretation when the agency’s decision is closer to the judge’s political 
preference). But see Barnett et al., supra note 128, at 1523–24 (“Utilizing the most 
comprehensive circuit court dataset to date, we find that, while there are some statistically 
significant results as to partisan influence, Chevron deference has a powerful constraining 
effect on partisanship in judicial decisionmaking.”). 
 152. Kavanaugh, supra note 114, at 2140 (stating judges who find the legislative history 
surrounding a statute is more in line with their policy preferences are subtly incentivized to 
call the statute ambiguous to allow a result more in line with their preferences; judges who 
disagree with the agency’s interpretation are conversely incentivized to find the statute 
unambiguous). 
 153. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 2311, 2357 (2006) (noting members of Congress “are significantly more likely to vote 
to delegate discretion to an executive branch controlled by their party and that Congress does 
indeed delegate significantly less, and with significantly more constraints, when the opposing 
party controls the executive branch”). 
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to take the path of least political resistance, as well as the temptation to act on the 
basis of policy preferences. And, unlike the merits of historical practice arguments, 
Chevron is more frequently and rigorously debated and discussed, providing robust 
signals about how the Court views congressional action. As a result, the Supreme 
Court’s changing approach to Chevron will provide insight into whether the Court 
finds congressional agreement to be persuasive evidence of a practice’s 
constitutionality in the future. 
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